Part 2 of the Multi-SaaS Supply Chain Investigation: uncovering the 68-domain CyberPanel precursor fleet, the webshell[.]lol canary bridge, real-time BBC Optimizely dropper swaps, Coruna/Hermes parallel iOS exploitation, and the 705-domain numeric .cc auxiliary fleet.
An end-to-end technical dissection of multi-stage web compromise campaigns bridging client-side web injection (ClickFix / Fake CAPTCHA lures) with desktop Trojan loaders and DLL sideloading.
A one-hour hunt turned up four fake verification pages impersonating different brands—all generated from the exact same typosquatting ClickFix kit and pointing to a single C2.
Why chasing rotating C2 domains leaves defenders one step behind, and how hunting on a shared JavaScript VM packer bootstrap uncovered over fifty compromised online stores.